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The political foundations of judicial independence in dictatorship and democracy / Brad Epperly.
Series: Oxford scholarship online: Publisher: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2019Edition: First editionDescription: 1 online resource : illustrations (black and white)Content type: text | still image Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9780191880384 (ebook) :Subject(s): Judicial independence
| Judicial power | Justice, Administration of -- Political aspectsAdditional Physical Form: Print version : 9780198845027DDC classification: 347.012 LOC classification: K3367Online resources: Oxford scholarship online Summary: Why do political actors tolerate courts able to check their power? This text argues that judicial independence as electorally-induced 'insurance' is about the risks of losing power, risks that are higher in autocratic regimes. Using a mixed-methods approach, it develops a theory of both de facto and de jure independence across regime type.
| Item type | Current library | Class number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ebook | House of Lords Library - Palace Online access | 1 | Available |
This edition also issued in print: 2019.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Why do political actors tolerate courts able to check their power? This text argues that judicial independence as electorally-induced 'insurance' is about the risks of losing power, risks that are higher in autocratic regimes. Using a mixed-methods approach, it develops a theory of both de facto and de jure independence across regime type.
Specialized.
Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on September 19, 2019).